> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.decepticon.red/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Threat Emulation

> Threat Gets a Vote — how Decepticon turns a threat profile into an executable engagement.

A red team engagement that does not emulate a real threat is just a structured pentest with extra paperwork. The discipline of **threat emulation** — mimicking the TTPs of a specific adversary — is what makes red teaming meaningful.

## "The Threat Gets a Vote"

The principle, codified by [redteam.guide](https://redteam.guide/docs/Concepts/red-teaming/) and inherited from military doctrine, is simple: **engagements must be grounded in what real threats actually do, not just what defenders plan for.**

A blue team that prepares for the threat they wish they had — instead of the threat that actually exists — has prepared for nothing. Decepticon enforces this principle by requiring an explicit threat profile before generating an OPPLAN.

## The Threat Profile

Decepticon adopts the seven-field threat profile structure used across the industry. Each engagement begins by selecting or authoring a profile:

| Field | Purpose | Example (AUTOBANK) |
| - | - | - |
| **Description** | Threat level, methods, motivation | "Financially motivated APT inspired by Carbanak" |
| **Goal & Intent** | What the threat actor is trying to achieve | "Access SWIFT infrastructure for fraudulent transfers" |
| **Key IOCs** | Indicators of compromise associated with the actor | Specific C2 domains, malware families, certificate patterns |
| **C2 Overview** | Channels, tiers, callback patterns | DNS, HTTPS, SMB; long-haul fallback to cloud-fronted CDN |
| **TTPs** | Tactics, techniques, procedures (mapped to MITRE ATT\&CK) | T1566.001 phishing, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1003.001 LSASS |
| **Exploitation** | Initial access methods | Spear-phishing with macro-enabled documents |
| **Persistence** | How continued presence is maintained | Scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions, service hijacking |

> [!NOTE]
>
> The threat profile is not a wishlist — it is a constraint. Decepticon will not use techniques that are out of profile, because the value of emulation is precisely that it teaches the blue team to recognize *that adversary*.

## How Decepticon Consumes a Threat Profile

When you start an engagement, the **Soundwave** planning agent interviews the operator and produces:

**1. ConOps draft with embedded threat profile**

Soundwave selects or composes a profile from the seven-field template, then weaves it into the Concept of Operations as the engagement's "adversary of record."

**2. OPPLAN objectives constrained to in-profile TTPs**

Each objective is tagged with MITRE ATT\&CK IDs. The orchestrator refuses to schedule objectives whose TTPs fall outside the profile.

**3. Skill loading filtered by profile match**

Decepticon's progressive-disclosure skill system loads only skills whose `mitre_attack` tags overlap with the profile. Out-of-profile skills are kept off the agent's working set.

**4. C2 channel selection by profile**

The C2 tier and channel choices (Sliver mTLS, HTTPS, DNS) are picked to mirror the profile's actual tradecraft — so the blue team's detections fire against the right shapes.

## Threat Profile vs. Pentest Scope

A pentest scope says *"these IPs, these apps, these dates."* A threat profile says *"this adversary, with these capabilities, motivated by these goals."* The two are not interchangeable.

| Pentest Scope | Threat Profile |
| - | - |
| "Test web app X" | "Emulate AUTOBANK's path to SWIFT" |
| Bounded by asset list | Bounded by TTP catalog |
| Success = vulnerabilities found | Success = blue team measured |
| Tools picked by tester | Tools picked by adversary |

## Authoring a Custom Profile

Custom profiles live alongside the default ones in the Soundwave skills directory. A minimal profile is YAML frontmatter plus prose:

```yaml theme={null}
---
name: cybersnake
description: "Espionage actor targeting energy sector — slow, patient, DNS-heavy C2"
goal_intent: "ICS reconnaissance and dwell"
c2_channels: [dns, https]
c2_tier: long_haul
mitre_attack:
  - T1078.004  # Cloud Accounts
  - T1090.003  # Multi-hop Proxy
  - T1071.004  # DNS C2
exploitation: "Compromised contractor VPN credentials"
persistence: "Service hijacking on jump hosts"
---

CYBERSNAKE prefers patience over noise. It will dwell for weeks
inside a network before any data movement, and routes all C2 through
DNS over a multi-hop proxy chain.
```

When this profile is selected, every Decepticon agent inherits its constraints — including the orchestrator's refusal to schedule fast-callback C2 or noisy initial-access vectors.

> [card] [Skill System](https://docs.decepticon.red/en/features/skill-system.md)
>
> See how progressive-disclosure skills filter by ATT\&CK overlap with the active threat profile.


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